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According to Agency Theory, the purpose of incentives in top-level executive 
compensation is relating the interests of top executives with the interests of 
shareholders, alleviating the agency conflict between top executives and shareholders. 
However on China’s capital market, there exists some abnormal phenomena in which 
the executive compensation are deviated greatly from the industry averages or 
uncorrelated even counterproductive to the company performance. 
  Some existing research had shown that the level of top executives’ compensation 
was affected by the managerial power, and it may reflected the defective corporate 
governance in the company with abnormal executive compensation. The senior 
management would use their power to adjust their own wages or treatment especially 
under poor internal corporate governance mechanism. It had broken the validity of 
management compensation contract, impacting the objective realization of 
maximizing the shareholder value. On the other hand, some other studies had found 
that in order to reduce the audit risks, CPA would disclose the defective corporate 
governance by issuing modified audit opinion. Besides, the report consumers also 
focus on the problem whether the independent audit could identify those companies 
with abnormal executive compensation by issuing modified audit opinion due to their 
own interests. 
  In this paper, 15286 sample data from the year 2003 to 2012 China’s A-share listed 
companies is chosen to make an empirical study on the impact of managerial power 
upon the abnormal executive compensation and the problem whether the independent 
audit could identify the abnormal executive compensation or not. Research results 
show that the managerial power increases the probability of listed companies with 
abnormal executive compensation as other variables have been controlled and the 
CPA would distinguish those companies with abnormal executive compensation from 
others to some extent. The probability of being issued modified audit opinion is 
significantly higher for those listed companies with abnormal low executive 
















compensation measured by absolute amounts, there is no clear evidence that the CPA 
had identified them. But for those listed companies with abnormal high executive 
compensation measured by relative amounts of top executives to normal staff ratio, 
there exists weak evidence that the CPA tended to issuing modified audit opinion. 
  Due to the research results, the suggestion part of this paper offers some proposal 
respectively for listed company and CPA. 
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利四个部分④，表 2.1 为上述四部分的简要说明： 
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